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Abstract
Background: During the 1990’s hospitals in the U.S were faced with cost containment charges, which may have
disproportionately impacted hospitals that serve poor patients. The purposes of this paper are to study the impact
of safety net activities on total profit margins and operating expenditures, and to trace these relationships over the
1990s for all U.S urban hospitals, controlling for hospital and market characteristics.
Methods: The primary data source used for this analysis is the Annual Survey of Hospitals from the American
Hospital Association and Medicare Hospital Cost Reports for years 1990-1999. Ordinary least square, hospital fixed
effects, and two-stage least square analyses were performed for years 1990-1999. Logged total profit margin and
operating expenditure were the dependent variables. The safety net activities are the socioeconomic status of the
population in the hospital serving area, and Medicaid intensity. In some specifications, we also included
uncompensated care burden.
Results: We found little evidence of negative effects of safety net activities on total margin. However, hospitals
serving a low socioeconomic population had lower expenditure raising concerns for the quality of the services
provided.
Conclusions: Despite potentially negative policy and market changes during the 1990s, safety net activities do not
appear to have imperiled the survival of hospitals. There may, however, be concerns about the long-term quality of
the services for hospitals serving low socioeconomic population.
Background
The closing decade of the twentieth centuryw i t n e s s e d
dramatic changes in the US health care system; hospi-
tals, accounting for the largest component of national
health expenditures, were forced to respond to a series
of measures designed to reduce health care costs [1].
The reductions in Medicare and Medicaid reimburse-
ment under the federal Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of
1997 and the earlier growth of managed care organiza-
tions were both intended to reduce the growth of hospi-
tal revenue. Younis et al. (2005) examined the hospital’s
total profit margin before and after the BBA of 1997 [2].
Their results indicated that hospitals profitability
decreased post BBA. Past research has indicated that
during this period some hospitals were successful in
maintaining their profitability; others experienced finan-
cial deterioration and, as a result, were sold or closed
[3,4]. Studies of hospitals in New York City and Califor-
nia documented a widened gap between financially
strong and financially weak hospitals [5,6]. The latter
findings are of particular concern to policy makers since
many of the financially weakest hospitals were those
with significant burdens of “safety net” activities or that
served low socioeconomic populations, Medicaid, and
uninsured patients [7].
In addition to the changes in market and policy envir-
onments that affected all hospitals, there were changes
that specifically impacted hospitals that were dispropor-
tionate providers of safety net activities or hospitals that
serve vulnerable populations such as the poor, Medicaid
beneficiaries and the uninsured [8]. Potential impacts
included an increase in the number of uninsured,
increased competition for the lowest-risk Medicaid
patients enrolled in Medicaid managed care plans,
increased price-shopping by private insurers, increased
concentration of uncompensated care in a smaller num-
ber of hospitals, and the slowdown in the growth in
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al. (2001) found that safety net hospitals were losing low
risk Medicaid patients as hospitals market became more
competitive over time. Gruber (1994) and Zwanziger et
al. (2000) found that price competition from managed
care plans reduced hospitals’ ability to increase rates for
privately insured patients to compensate for their losses
from treating uninsured or under-insured patients. Dra-
nove et al. (1998) reported that Medicaid-dependent
hospitals were not able to cost shift to other paying
populations and, when faced with budgetary constraints,
responded by decreasing the number or quality of ser-
vices provided; such hospitals were also more likely to
close. This threatening combination of policy and mar-
ket changes suggests that hospitals providing dispropor-
tionate share of safety net activities faced sharply
increased fiscal pressures during the 1990s, though only
limited direct evidence exists to support this conclusion.
Empirical studies of hospitals with high safety net
activities have produced no clear consensus as to their
financial status. Both Zuckerman et al. (2001) and Baz-
zoli et al.(2005) for example, found that hospitals ranked
in the highest 10th percentile in the provision of
uncompensated care and/or of hospitals with corre-
spondingly disproportionately high shares of uncompen-
sated care performed more poorly compared to the
profitability of other hospitals during 1990-2002 [16,17].
Other studies found that hospitals that served vulnerable
populations were able to survive during 1990s by adopt-
ing strategies that decreased costs and maximized reven-
ues in response to market and policy changes [7,18]. For
example, Felland et al. (2003) found that safety net hos-
pitals in 9 of 12 communities studied were not only
intact from 1990-2000 but were also able to expand and
improve services to the uninsured by streamlining their
operations, engaging in integration, and actively pursu-
ing paying patients. Other studies found no, or even
positive, relationships between safety net activities (such
as providing care to the uninsured and Medicaid benefi-
ciaries) and financial performance [19-22]. However,
majority of these studies were focused on specific geo-
graphical areas limiting the generalizability of these stu-
dies to respond to concerns about the continued
financial health of hospitals that provide services to vul-
nerable populations.
The primary objective of this paper is to use data from
the 1990s to trace the relationship between safety net
activities and two dimensions of financial performance-
profitability and operating expenditure, among all urban
hospitals. We chose those dimensions because they pro-
vide complementary perspectives on the financial
impacts of safety net activities during this period of
market and policy turbulence. Profitability provides an
indicator of a hospital’s long-term viability since
chronically unprofitable hospitals tend to close [23]. But
maintaining profitable margins is not enough from a
policy perspective, particularly if hospital accomplishes
t h i sa tt h ee x p e n s eo fq u a l i t y[ 1 0 , 2 4 ] .O n ee x a m p l eo f
undesirable means of maintaining profitability would be
to lower expenditures by reducing the number of ser-
vices or mix of care provided to low income and/or
uninsured population. For instance, Langa and Sussman
( 1 9 9 3 )f o u n dt h a th o s p i t a l sr e d u c e dt h ei n t e n s i t yo fs e r -
vices provided to Medicaid patients in response to
financial cuts [25].
We assess the relationship between two safety net
activities, the provision of care to Medicaid beneficiaries
and to low socioeconomic populations, and their effect
on total profit margin and operating expenditure. In
addition, we take advantage of the availability of uncom-
pensated care data from 2002 and test the effect of add-
ing this safety net activity to our analysis. We use
multivariate regression models with controls for many
time-varying measures and hospital fixed effect estima-
tion approach, which controls for hospital specific time-
invariant measures. By using large, nationally represen-
tative, longitudinal data, and a robust research design
we have improved on earlier studies and provide cred-
ible estimates of the relationship between safety net
activities and hospitals financial performance.
Methods
Data
We focused our analysis on urban hospitals, defined as
those located in any metropolitan statistical area (MSA).
The sample was further limited to nonfederal, short-
term, general acute care hospitals-hospitals most
accessed by patients from vulnerable populations. The
period studied was 1990-1999-a time when the hospitals
faced major policy and market pressures. Our national,
hospital-level database combined information from sev-
eral sources. Data on hospital annual operating reven-
ues, expenditures, discharges, teaching intensity, and
payer mix were obtained from the annual Medicare
Hospital Cost Reports spanning the entire decade.
Reporting cycles varied between hospitals, so data from
successive cost reports were linked and then annualized.
T h e s ed a t aw e r es u p p l e m e n t e db ya d d i t i o n a lh o s p i t a l
characteristics such as total outpatient visits and hospital
ownership from the American Hospital Association
Annual Hospital Survey (1990-1999). The Medicare
Hospital Market Service Area Files (HMAF) for 1989,
1995, and 2001 were used to define hospitals service
areas. The socioeconomic characteristics for each service
area were calculated using 1990 and 2000 US Census of
Population and Housing data and were estimated for
1995. Finally, we used uncompensated care charges
available in the 2002-2003 CMS-2552-96 Hospital Cost
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care burden.
The level of competition was measured through
Hirschman-Herfindal indices (HHI) (defined below) for
years 1990, 1995, and 2000 and imputed for intermedi-
ate years. The hospital HHI used the Medicare HMAF
data and data on system membership from the William-
son Institute multi-hospital system for years 1989, 1995
and 2001. The mean health maintenance organization
(HMO) penetration by provider was generated using the
InterStudy Regional Market Analysis database for 1994-
1999. HMO penetration was defined as the proportion
of patients in a geographic region enrolled in any HMO
in the hospital market.
There were 24170 hospital*year observations in the
AHA data. Of these, 7490 observations were deleted due
to missing financial data. The mean differences on hos-
pital characteristics between omitted and included
observations, although statistically significant, were
small. The hospitals that were omitted were slightly
smaller and for-profit. The final sample size was 16,680
hospital*year observations.
Construction of dependent variables and covariates
Dependent variables
We used the ratio of total hospital revenue to total
expenses-rather than the corresponding operating mea-
sures [22] - to measure profitability since we want to
assess the impact of safety net activities on financial via-
bility where the effect of non-operating revenue, e.g.,
public subsidies, are critical. As hospitals might maintain
profit margins by decreasing expenses (and thereby
quality), our other dependent variable was operating
expenditures. We used logged forms to account for
skewness associated with such measures.
Safety net activities
We focused on two measures of safety net activity: ser-
ving a low socioeconomic population and Medicaid
intensity. These measures were selected based on IOM
definition which defines “core safety net hospitals” as
those serving uninsured, Medicaid and other vulnerable
population For a more detailed description of the con-
struction of the safety net activities readers are referred
to [8].
The safety net variables were constructed as follows:
a) Serving a low SES populationThe socioeconomic
status (SES) of the patients residing in a hospital service
area was calculated based on the hospital’sd i s c h a r g e s .
We first identified a hospital’s service area based on the
zip codes that cumulatively accounted for 75% of its dis-
charges, using the Medicare HMAF files. We then used
the census data to estimate four SES measures for these
zip codes-weighting by the size of the relevant popula-
tion in the zip code area: a) the percentage of the
population 25 years of age and older that did not have
high school diplomas, b) the percentage of minority resi-
dents (African-American, Native American, and non-
black Hispanic), c) median household income, and d)
percentage of the residents with incomes below the pov-
erty line. As the SES measures were highly correlated,
we extracted a common measure using principal com-
ponent analysis for each study year. This common mea-
sure was defined as the “SES index.” The index was
normalized annually to have a mean of zero and a var-
iance of one. Higher values of the index indicate lower
socioeconomic status.
b) Medicaid intensityMedicaid intensity was the pro-
portion of a hospital’sa d m i s s i o n st h a tw e r ei n s u r e db y
Medicaid, adjusted for overall average proportion of
Medicaid admissions in the MSA as we wanted to focus
on hospital relative participation in safety net activities
within MSAs.
In some specifications, we added uncompensated care
burden. The uncompensated care burden was calculated
from the uncompensated care charges divided by total
charges extracted from the Medicare Cost Report data
set.
Market competition
We used the Medicare HMAF data to calculate the
competitiveness of each hospital’s market. The Medicare
HMAF data sets provided the number of Medicare
patients discharged from ah o s p i t a lt h a tr e s i d ei na
given zip code area (ZCA) in a given year. The measure
of competition we used is HHI, a measure of competi-
tion developed by economists to incorporate both the
number of competitors and their relative market share
in a single measure[26,27] is defined as follows:
HHI Market Sharei i
 ()
2
where the sum is over all the competitors in the
market.
We found the market shares of the competing hospi-
tals in each ZCA and then summed the squares of these
market shares to calculate the ZCA’s HHI. We then cal-
culated the relative proportion of each hospital’sd i s -
charges contributed by each ZCA. These proportions
were used to calculate a weighted average HHI as the
measure of the competitiveness of the hospital’s market.
The following formula summarizes the calculation:
HHI w HHI ii j j j

where
HHIi-is the HHI for the i
th hospital; wij-is the propor-
tion of discharges from hospital i that reside in ZCA j;
HHIj-is the HHI for the j
th ZCA.
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[28,29]. The HHI calculated in this manner assume
that the hospitals are all independent. We then incor-
porated membership in local hospital systems by chan-
ging the calculation of theZ C AH H I .T h es p e c i f i c
algorithms are described elsewhere [30]. Membership
information was obtained from the Williamson Insti-
tute of the Medical College of Virginia provided the
lists of member hospitals and systems for 1989, 1995,
and 2001 using a variety of sources including the
American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of
Hospitals, the Institute’s own surveys, and direct con-
tacts. Systems were only based on common ownership
within the same MSA and did not include looser, con-
tractual affiliations.
Other covariates
We used the Medicare wage index from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to control for
differential geographic labor input prices. The models
also include the hospital case mix index from the CMS
to account for severity of the discharges across the hos-
pitals. We also included input price measures such as
discharges, visits, and Medicare patient mix. Further, all
model specifications control for year fixed effects.
Instruments for Medicaid
We used an instrumental variable approach to account
for potential endogeneity of the Medicaid intensity. We
identified determinants of Medicaid intensity from the
literature that were plausibly uncorrelated with depen-
dent variable conditional on covariates. We experimen-
ted with the following instruments: MSA-level employer
characteristics from Statistics of US business; number of
public hospitals in the county and presence of a trauma
center from AHA; MSA population size and proportion
of Hispanics and African-Americans from Area
Resource File; unemployment rate from Bureau of Labor
Statistics; and Medicaid eligibility thresholds for preg-
nant women, children, and elderly collected from pub-
lished resources [31-34]. Based on the results from the
first stage and the over-identification test, the best set of
instruments were state-level Medicaid eligibility thresh-
olds for elderly, medically needy thresholds for elderly
and county-level unemployment rate.
Model specification
Hospital profitability is broadly determined by the rela-
tionship of the demand for a hospital’s services to the
costs of the inputs used to produce them. The demand
for a hospital’s services will depend on its characteris-
tics (ownership, size and teaching status), the popula-
tion it serves (demographics including their
socioeconomic characteristics and health status), and
its market environment (particularly managed care
penetration and the competitiveness of the hospital’s
market). Hospital cost structures largely depend on:
input costs, particularly wage rates; outputs (reflecting
the economies or diseconomies of scale and scope);
and market and payer environments [28,35]. We test
whether hospitals’ safety net activities influence hospi-
tals profitability and/or hospital expenses. Such rela-
tionships are plausible since safety net activities could
both increase cost (e.g., due to a more acute case mix,
increased wage rates due to higher demand for ser-
vices). The situation may have been exacerbated during
1990s when hospitals were faced with potentially dis-
advantageous policy and market changes.
In developing the models, we follow the methodology
specified in Zwanziger et al. (2000) [14]. We used the
logarithm of the output and input price levels and hos-
pital-specific fixed effects estimator in a multivariable
regression model. The hospital-specific fixed effects spe-
cification reduces the impact of potential omitted vari-
ables that are relatively stable over time and hospital-
specific. By focusing on the relationship between
changes in each independent variable and profitability
over time, the fixed effects specification provides a more
robust indicator of relationships between dependent and
independent variables than does Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). We tested whether the fixed effects were signifi-
cant and if random effects would be more appropriate.
The fixed effects specification was significant at p =
0.01. Further, the Hausman specification test found sys-
tematic differences between fixed and random effects
coefficients indicating that fixed effects would be an
appropriate choice. Finally, in view of the potential
endogeneity of Medicaid intensity, we used instrumental
variable estimation approach. Medicaid intensity can be
endogenous because higher Medicaid admission can
possibly tend to lower profitability (due to lower reim-
bursement rates) but, simultaneously, lower profitability
may possibly lead to higher proportion of Medicaid
patients (e.g., due to a fewer amenities). We tested for
the validity of the instruments using first-stage, over-
identification, and endogeneity tests [36,37].
For all of these specifications, we used two versions of
the safety net activities: a continuous version that tested
for an overall relationship between the intensity of the
activity and the dependent variable of interest and an
indicator variable for the highest 5th percentile for each
measure to test for possible threshold effects. We used
the top 5th percentile cutoff because hospitals in the
top 5th percentile were most likely to be stable on safety
net activities over time (results not shown).
The models estimated had the following variables:
Yit f OUTPit TEACHit MANi COMPit MEDit SNit CMit MWit YEAR  (, , , , , , , , t tI N T E R i t
fi eit
,) 

where
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of hospital i in year t,
￿ OUTPit are outputs (discharges, outpatient visits,
and second order interactions) of hospital i in year t,
￿ TEACHit is a measure of teaching activities
(intern/bed ratio) of hospital i in year t,
￿ MANi is the mean HMO penetration in hospital i’s
market,
￿ COMPit is the concentration (HHI adjusted for
membership in local hospital systems) for hospital i
in year t. For this variable t takes on the values,
1990, 1995, and 1999,
￿ MEDit is the proportion of Medicare discharges
for hospital i in year t,
￿ SNit are the safety net activities (SES index, Medi-
caid intensity, uncompensated care burden) for hos-
pital i in year t,
￿ CMit is the case mix index of hospital i in year t,
￿ MWit is the Medicare wage index of hospital i in
year t,
￿ YEAR t is the year indicator variable for year t, and
￿ INTER it are the interactions of market and safety
net activities with year dummies for hospital i in
year t
￿ fi is the hospital fixed effect, and
￿ eit is the error that is i.i.d.
Safety net activities, payer mix, HHI and managed care
penetration are interacted with time to allow for differ-
ential time effects.
Results
Table 1 present the means and standard deviations of
the variables in the multivariate models. The average
total margin for the hospitals studied during the period
was 5%. The average Medicaid intensity was 14%.
Figure 1 provides comparisons of total profit mar-
gins, and operating expenditures during the 1990s by
the intensity of their safety net activities. Figure 1 does
n o ta d j u s tf o ra n yc o v a r i a t e s .I ng e n e r a l ,t h ep r o f i t
margin increased in the early 1990s reaching their
peak in 1996 and dropping thereafter. This drop is
consistent with the drop in hospitals profit during
1997 following the introduction of the BBA of 1997.
For hospitals in the highest 5
th percentile of safety net
activity, peak profitability was in 1994. Operating
expenditures continued to increase in the 1990s, drop-
ping in 1997 for hospitals with the highest 5
th percen-
tile safety net activities and increased thereafter. In
general, all the graphs display a consistent inverse rela-
tionship between profitability and safety net activities
providing preliminary support for the view that hospi-
tals with disproportionately higher safety net activities
tended to be under greater financial stress than hospi-
tals with lower safety net activities. However, it is not
clear whether safety net hospitals were particularly dis-
advantaged during the study period.
Table 2 displays the estimated coefficients of the effect
of safety net activity on profitability using OLS and hos-
pital fixed effects specifications for continuous safety net
activities and fixed effects specification for binary forms.
The coefficients of Medicaid intensity were not statisti-
cally significant in either OLS or fixed effects specifica-
tion except for 1997. In 1997, this coefficient was
positive and marginally significant in the fixed effects
model indicating that Medicaid intensity was more prof-
itable for that year. The coefficients of the SES index
from the OLS model were significantly negative until
1991, rose in the mid-1990s, and were significantly
negative in the later years. The fixed effects model, how-
ever, indicated that the SES index was not significantly
different from zero and the coefficients were small.
Table 2 also presents fixed effect specification for binary
safety net variables. The models trace time interaction for
safety net activities with 1990 as the reference year. The
coefficient on Medicaid intensity is positive and significant
beginning in 1994, indicating that hospitals with high
Medicaid intensity were more likely to be profitable in
later years relative to 1990. For the SES index the time
interactions were positive and significant for 1992 and
1993, indicating that hospitals with low SES population
had higher profits for those years relative to 1990.
We also estimated the models using 2SLS to account for
potential endogeneity of Medicaid intensity. The partial F
test for our excluded instruments from the first stage (for
Medicaid intensity) was F (2, 1725) = 82.45. The Hansen J
statistics for the over-identification test for the instrument
had p value of 0.1536, suggesting that our instruments
were not correlated with profit margin. Hence, the two
tests indicate that our instruments predicted Medicaid
intensity and are valid. In addition, we tested for the endo-
geneity of our Medicaid intensity using a Hausman-Speci-
fication test. The P value for this test was 0.9269; thus, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of Medi-
caid intensity. This was also evident when we compared
the estimates of Medicaid intensity between OLS and
fixed effects. The estimates are identical across the two
specifications, bolstering the possibility that Medicaid
intensity in our sample is exogenous.
Results from models that included uncompensated
care burden were similar to the models without uncom-
pensated care (data not shown). Inclusion of uncompen-
s a t e dc a r ed i dn o ti n f l u e n c et h ec o e f f i c i e n to fo t h e r
safety net activities. In general, we did not find any sta-
tistically significant impact of uncompensated care bur-
den on profitability and its time interactions do not
reveal any statistically significant time trend.
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activities on hospital operating expenditure. In both the
OLS and fixed effects specifications A higher SES index
was associated with lower hospital expenditure and this
effect was significant. For Medicaid intensity, the OLS
model found that Medicaid intensity was associated with
decreased operating expenditure. However, in the fixed
effects specification, Medicaid intensity did not signifi-
cantly impact operating expenditure indicating that the
OLS results were due to time invariant hospital character-
istics. Here also, we experimented with 2SLS. Results from
Hausman specification test indicated that Medicaid admis-
sion was endogenous in the expenditure models. However,
the second stage estimates were too imprecise to be infor-
mative, our standard errors for second stage increased
from 0.02 to 0.25. The models that included uncompen-
sated care burden did not affect the safety net and Medi-
caid intensity coefficients. In addition, there was no
evidence of significant effect of uncompensated care bur-
den on operating expenditure and its time interactions did
not reveal any statistically significant time trend.
Discussion
Our study found that after controlling for the major
hospital, market, and policy variables, safety net activ-
ities had relatively small, and in general statistically
insignificant, effects on hospital profit margins through-
out the 1990s. Medicaid intensity, in both OLS and
fixed effects specifications had little effect on profit mar-
gin. From the regression models, hospitals with high
Medicaid intensities (highest 5
th percentile) had some-
what higher profit margins, significantly so after 1994.
In the OLS specifications, low-SES population was asso-
ciated with reduced profit margin and the magnitude of
this effect increased over time but was still relatively
small. This relationship, however, disappeared in both
the fixed effects specification and for hospitals serving
the lowest SES (highest SES index) populations. In sum-
mary, during the period studied, safety net activity had
only a small effect on hospital profitability.
Our second objective was to assess the effect of safety
net activities on operating expenditure. Had hospitals
responded by maintaining profitability at the cost of
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Figure 1 Trend in total profit margin and operating expenditure by safety net activities.
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Page 6 of 12decreasing their quality of care? The hospitals can
reduce the quality of the care by either altering the mix
of services or number of services provided to the unin-
sured. Our expenditure model indicated that during our
study period there was a negative relationship between
the SES index and hospital expenditures. We did not
find evidence of a similar relationship with Medicaid
intensity. Hospitals serving lower SES (higher SES
index) populations had significantly lower expenditures
compared to hospitals with high SES populations. In
models with continuous SES index this effect remained
consistently negative for the entire study period. Inter-
estingly, in the models with “binary” variables, there was
no significant difference in expenditures. Medicaid
intensity was negatively related to expenditures from
1990 to 1995 but only reached statistical significance in
1991. After 1995 the relationship was positive but not
significant. There was no statistically significant effect of
Medicaid intensity in these models. Although the
uncompensated care data were only available for 1 year,
there was no evidence of negative effect of uncompen-
sated care burden on profit margin and operating
expenditure. Further, the addition of this variable to the
models did not significantly affect the coefficients of
Medicaid intensity and SES index.
Study limitations
Representativeness-Neither the Medicare Hospital Cost
Report nor the American Hospital Association reports
contains usable data for all urban hospitals. The use of a
sub-set of hospitals in an analysis raises concerns for the
representativeness regarding our sample. This concern is
mitigated for the primary analyses both by the large pro-
portion of all urban hospitals in our sample and by the
fact that the mean differences between key hospital char-
acteristics (e.g., ownership, Medicaid admission, and size)
were small across observations that were included in the
analysis and those that were omitted due to missing data.
Time period studied
The BBA was enacted in 1997 and had not yet had its
full impact by 1999. It is unclear whether the relation-
ships observed in the 1990s will persist after 1999 as
greater cuts are phased in. The observed trend, towards
lower expenditures in the later years, does suggest that
the BBA may have had a significant impact, especially
with higher Medicaid intensity being associated to lower
expenditures. Additional years of data will be required
to enable a test of the stability of these relationships.
Definition of safety net activities
Prior studies of safety net hospitals have also used pub-
lic ownership and/or teaching status or the dispropor-
tionate provision of uncompensated care to designate
safety net hospitals. Teaching status and ownership were
included as covariates in the OLS specifications. In gen-
eral, our results paralleled those seen in prior studies,
teaching hospitals tended to have lower profits and
higher expenditures, public hospitals tended to have
lower profits and similar expenditures independent of
the level of their safety net activities. A more serious
concern arises from the omission of uncompensated
care from the primary analyses. The provision of
uncompensated care is clearly a critical safety net
dimension, and the uncompensated care burden should
be included in an analysis of the effects of safety net
activities. We excluded this measure from the primary
analyses simply because of the limited data that were
available at the time of the analysis. The CMS Hospital
Cost Reports-responding to a pressing public policy
need-began to collect uncompensated care data for the
2002-2003 period. We included these data in some test
specifications, based on the observation that the hospi-
tals’ provision of uncompensated care is relatively
stable-and so highly correlated from year to year. The
inclusion of this variable had almost no effect on the
coefficients of the other two variables, and it had a weak
and statistically insignificant relationship with both
dependent variables. Analysis of data from a later study
period should be performed to confirm these findings.
We also acknowledge the conceptual limitations asso-
ciated with our safety net activities. For instance, our
safety net measures assume that Medicare service area is
similar to hospitals commercial and Medicaid service
area. Ideally, we would have liked to use a validated
national discharge data; however, data availability pre-
cludes that. More importantly, prior work by Goodman
Table 1 Means and standard deviations of variables in
the regression model
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Total operating margin 0.0003 0.0817
Total profit margin 0.0480 0.0690
Total expenditure (millions $) 96.900 92.000
SES index
a -0.0993 0.9252
Medicaid intensity 0.1375 0.1218
Uncompensated care burden 3.7013 5.3715
Discharges 10938 7887.0
Outpatient visits 122389 116644
Intern-to-bed ratio 0.0549 0.1267
Not-for-profit 0.7363 0.4407
For-profit 0.1436 0.3507
System HHI 0.3642 0.1175
Mean HMO penetration 0.2565 0.1374
% Medicare admission 0.4801 0.1379
N 16680
Notes:
Source: AHA Annual Hospital Survey and Medicare Hospital Cost Reports
(1990-1999)
aA high score on SES index indicates low socioeconomic status
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Page 7 of 12Table 2 Effect of safety net activities on hospital total profit margin
Continuous safety net measures Binary safety net measures
(1) OLS (2) Fe (3) Fe-Binary
Log Medicaid intensity * 1990 -0.037 [0.023] -0.021 [0.027]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1991 -0.040 [0.022] -0.025 [0.024] -0.005 [0.007]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1992 -0.016 [0.023] -0.002 [0.022] 0.011 [0.009]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1993 -0.034 [0.020] -0.016 [0.021] 0.015 [0.010]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1994 -0.012 [0.019] 0.032 [0.020] 0.024 [0.010]*
Log Medicaid intensity * 1995 -0.017 [0.021] 0.011 [0.019] 0.024 [0.011]*
Log Medicaid intensity * 1996 -0.013 [0.023] 0.033 [0.021] 0.026 [0.010]*
Log Medicaid intensity * 1997 0.004 [0.025] 0.057 [0.023]* 0.033 [0.011]**
Log Medicaid intensity * 1998 0.016 [0.030] 0.046 [0.028] 0.048 [0.015]**
Log Medicaid intensity * 1999 0.001 [0.028] 0.030 [0.028] 0.029 [0.013]*
SES index
a *1990 -0.007 [0.002]** 0.003 [0.007]
SES index *1991 -0.005 [0.002]* 0.006 [0.006] 0.006 [0.007]
SES index *1992 -0.001 [0.002] 0.009 [0.006] 0.014 [0.011]
SES index *1993 0.002 [0.002] 0.012 [0.006] 0.032 [0.011]**
SES index *1994 0.001 [0.002] 0.011 [0.007] 0.026 [0.012]*
SES index *1995 -0.001 [0.002] 0.009 [0.007] 0.018 [0.012]
SES index *1996 -0.007 [0.002]** 0.003 [0.006] 0.009 [0.012]
SES index *1997 -0.008 [0.003]** 0.001 [0.007] 0.010 [0.013]
SES index *1998 -0.012 [0.003]** -0.001 [0.007] 0.004 [0.015]
SES index *1999 -0.010 [0.003]** 0.001 [0.007] 0.028 [0.017]
log(case mix index) -0.365 [0.119]** 0.020 [0.156] -0.010 [0.156]
log(discharges) 0.182 [0.037]** 0.334 [0.065]** 0.345 [0.065]**
Log(visits) 0.003 [0.026] 0.013 [0.027] 0.008 [0.028]
Log(discharges)squared -0.008 [0.003]** -0.017 [0.004]** -0.018 [0.004]**
Log(visits)squared 0.001 [0.002] -0.001 [0.001] -0.001 [0.001]
Log(case mix)*log(discharged) 0.044 [0.013]** -0.001 [0.017] 0.003 [0.017]
Log(visits)*log(discharges) -0.002 [0.003] 0.002 [0.003] 0.001 [0.003]
Log(Medicare wage index) 0.060 [0.092] 0.307 [0.167] 0.282 [0.166]
Log(Medicare wage index)squared -0.125 [0.034]** -0.044 [0.042] -0.040 [0.042]
Log(visits)*log(Medicare wage index) 0.005 [0.010] -0.010 [0.011] -0.008 [0.011]
Log(discharges)*log(Medicare wage index) -0.016 [0.012] -0.014 [0.019] -0.013 [0.018]
Log(intern-to-bed ratio) -0.063 [0.012]** -0.103 [0.042]* -0.103 [0.042]*
Not-for-profit -0.007 [0.003]*
For-profit 0.020 [0.005]**
1991 dummy 0.004 [0.012] 0.004 [0.010] 0.003 [0.008]
1992 dummy -0.010 [0.013] -0.004 [0.013] -0.003 [0.010]
1993 dummy -0.031 [0.013]* -0.027 [0.013]* -0.031 [0.010]**
1994 dummy -0.021 [0.015] -0.025 [0.014] -0.016 [0.011]
1995 dummy -0.013 [0.015] -0.010 [0.015] -0.009 [0.011]
1996 dummy -0.018 [0.016] -0.020 [0.016] -0.011 [0.012]
1997 dummy -0.020 [0.017] -0.020 [0.016] -0.006 [0.012]
1998 dummy -0.035 [0.018] -0.020 [0.018] -0.013 [0.014]
1999 dummy -0.044 [0.019]* -0.027 [0.019] -0.022 [0.015]
Log percent Medicare*1990 -0.063 [0.023]** 0.002 [0.032] -0.007 [0.030]
Log percent Medicare*1991 -0.065 [0.019]** -0.002 [0.030] -0.013 [0.028]
Log percent Medicare*1992 -0.035 [0.023] 0.018 [0.029] 0.008 [0.028]
Log percent Medicare*1993 -0.013 [0.020] 0.047 [0.028] 0.049 [0.027]
Log percent Medicare*1994 -0.029 [0.019] 0.038 [0.026] 0.019 [0.025]
Log percent Medicare*1995 -0.003 [0.021] 0.057 [0.026]* 0.050 [0.025]*
Log percent Medicare*1996 0.010 [0.023] 0.075 [0.027]** 0.061 [0.025]*
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Page 8 of 12et al. [38] indicates that the services area for Medicaid,
Medicare, and commercial population were similar.
Association rather than causality
This study attempts to assess whether increases in safety
net activities lower total profitability and/or operating
expenditure. Causality is notoriously difficult to prove in
the social sciences, and this study is no exception. Given
that regression analyses measure the degree of associa-
tion between the dependent and independent variables,
one can only infer the plausibility of a causal relation-
ship. In addition to these general concerns, there is a
specific concern because one might expect Medicaid
intensity to be endogenous. With regard to overall caus-
ality, we used OLS and FE specifications since the two
test for different dimensions of the relationship between
dependent and independent variables-the former, the
overall association; the latter relates changes over time
in the dependent and independent variables for each
hospital. In most cases, the two specifications are con-
sistent, strengthening the plausibility of the relationship.
The OLS results indicate that a higher SES index
reduces profitability, whereas the fixed effects specifica-
tion shows no statistically significant relationship. These
findings are broadly consistent with the aggregate data-
hospitals in lower SES areas were less profitable at any
given point in time, but their trends over time were no
different than the other hospitals. In addition, the non-
significant relationship in the fixed effects models may
reflect the fact that the SES index only has small varia-
tion over time since it is anchored on three points
(1990, 1995, and 2000). To the extent possible, we
tested for endogeneity and found that the results of our
analysis are consistent with the exogeneity of Medicaid
admissions for the profit margin model, even if these
results are not definitive. These results suggest that the
observed relationships are robust.
Implications
The results of our study suggest that the political and mar-
ket turbulence during the 1990s did not disproportionately
impact hospitals serving vulnerable populations and/or
having high Medicaid intensities. For the most part, these
increased safety net activities, whether measured continu-
ously or for the highest 5
th percentile, did not negatively
affect financial performance to a significant extent during
the study period. Even when these relationships did reach
statistical significance, their effects were small. It is striking
that the two safety net dimensions that are recognized in
Table 2: Effect of safety net activities on hospital total profit margin (Continued)
Log percent Medicare*1997 0.011 [0.023] 0.075 [0.027]** 0.056 [0.025]*
Log percent Medicare*1998 -0.020 [0.026] 0.018 [0.030] 0.017 [0.028]
Log percent Medicare*1999 -0.020 [0.026] 0.014 [0.030] 0.013 [0.029]
Log(System HHI)*1990 0.025 [0.004]** 0.003 [0.011] 0.001 [0.010]
Log(System HHI)*1991 0.025 [0.004]** -0.000 [0.011] -0.004 [0.011]
Log(System HHI)*1992 0.026 [0.005]** 0.002 [0.011] -0.003 [0.011]
Log(System HHI)*1993 0.014 [0.004]** -0.008 [0.011] -0.010 [0.011]
Log(System HHI)*1994 0.010 [0.004]* -0.013 [0.011] -0.016 [0.011]
Log(System HHI)*1995 0.020 [0.005]** -0.002 [0.011] -0.005 [0.011]
Log(System HHI)*1996 0.019 [0.005]** -0.002 [0.011] -0.002 [0.011]
Log(System HHI)*1997 0.025 [0.006]** 0.003 [0.012] 0.004 [0.012]
Log(System HHI)*1998 0.018 [0.008]* -0.001 [0.013] 0.004 [0.013]
Log(System HHI)*1999 0.022 [0.007]** 0.006 [0.012] 0.012 [0.013]
Mean HMO penetration*1990 -0.039 [0.011]**
Mean HMO penetration*1991 -0.040 [0.010]** -0.006 [0.009] -0.012 [0.008]
Mean HMO penetration*1992 -0.038 [0.011]** -0.005 [0.012] -0.018 [0.012]
Mean HMO penetration*1993 -0.023 [0.011]* 0.013 [0.013] -0.003 [0.012]
Mean HMO penetration*1994 -0.038 [0.011]** 0.000 [0.013] -0.014 [0.012]
Mean HMO penetration*1995 -0.044 [0.011]** -0.009 [0.014] -0.019 [0.013]
Mean HMO penetration*1996 -0.040 [0.012]** 0.001 [0.015] 0.001 [0.014]
Mean HMO penetration*1997 -0.040 [0.013]** -0.001 [0.015] 0.001 [0.014]
Mean HMO penetration*1998 -0.040 [0.016]* 0.006 [0.017] 0.012 [0.016]
Mean HMO penetration*1999 -0.030 [0.017] 0.025 [0.019] 0.032 [0.018]
Observations 16680 16680 16680
Notes:
Source: AHA Annual Hospital Survey and Medicare Hospital Cost Reports (1990-1999)
aA high score on SES index indicates low socioeconomic status Robust standard errors in brackets
*Significant at p < 0.05; ** significant at p < 0.01%
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Page 9 of 12Table 3 Effect of safety net activities on operating expenditure
Continuous safety net measures Binary safety net measures
(1) OLS (2) Fe (3) Fe-Binary
Log Medicaid intensity * 1990 -0.239 [0.074]** -0.090 [0.053]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1991 -0.245 [0.073]** -0.115 [0.046]* -0.007 [0.011]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1992 -0.225 [0.077]** -0.077 [0.042] -0.008 [0.013]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1993 -0.162 [0.076]* -0.031 [0.038] 0.003 [0.014]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1994 -0.170 [0.077]* -0.028 [0.037] -0.003 [0.017]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1995 -0.043 [0.076] -0.013 [0.038] 0.001 [0.019]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1996 0.139 [0.080] 0.035 [0.041] 0.011 [0.021]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1997 0.161 [0.078]* 0.026 [0.043] 0.010 [0.024]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1998 0.230 [0.075]** 0.062 [0.047] 0.011 [0.025]
Log Medicaid intensity * 1999 0.231 [0.070]** 0.013 [0.048] 0.006 [0.026]
SES index *1990 -0.008 [0.007] -0.086 [0.014]**
SES index *1991 -0.011 [0.007] -0.087 [0.013]** -0.005 [0.012]
SES index *1992 -0.005 [0.007] -0.084 [0.013]** 0.015 [0.015]
SES index *1993 -0.012 [0.007] -0.086 [0.013]** 0.008 [0.016]
SES index *1994 -0.012 [0.007] -0.086 [0.013]** 0.026 [0.020]
SES index *1995 -0.017 [0.007]* -0.086 [0.013]** 0.036 [0.023]
SES index *1996 -0.024 [0.007]** -0.090 [0.013]** 0.033 [0.024]
SES index *1997 -0.028 [0.007]** -0.094 [0.014]** 0.026 [0.026]
SES index *1998 -0.028 [0.007]** -0.099 [0.014]** 0.029 [0.026]
SES index *1999 -0.033 [0.007]** -0.102 [0.014]** 0.019 [0.027]
log(case mix index) 2.953 [0.471]** 0.054 [0.329] 0.156 [0.331]
log(discharges) 0.163 [0.137] 0.436 [0.128]** 0.453 [0.132]**
Log(visits) 0.271 [0.106]* 0.003 [0.053] 0.002 [0.054]
Log(discharges) squared 0.068 [0.010]** 0.028 [0.008]** 0.031 [0.008]**
Log(visits) squared 0.012 [0.007] 0.020 [0.003]** 0.022 [0.003]**
Log(case mix)*log(discharged) -0.216 [0.051]** 0.024 [0.037] 0.014 [0.037]
Log(visits)*log(discharges) -0.047 [0.014]** -0.044 [0.007]** -0.050 [0.008]**
Log(Medicare wage index) 0.371 [0.393] 0.216 [0.374] 0.267 [0.382]
Log(Medicare wage index)squared 0.106 [0.135] -0.117 [0.091] -0.109 [0.091]
Log(visits)*log(Medicare wage index) 0.132 [0.042]** -0.031 [0.025] -0.045 [0.026]
Log(discharges)*log(Medicare wage index) -0.169 [0.049]** 0.015 [0.042] 0.027 [0.042]
Log(intern-to-bed ratio) 0.915 [0.049]** 0.174 [0.086]* 0.151 [0.086]
Not-for-profit -0.005 [0.011]
For-profit -0.022 [0.014]
1991 dummy 0.123 [0.022]** 0.137 [0.014]** 0.128 [0.011]**
1992 dummy 0.227 [0.028]** 0.249 [0.017]** 0.258 [0.014]**
1993 dummy 0.302 [0.033]** 0.328 [0.020]** 0.354 [0.017]**
1994 dummy 0.395 [0.035]** 0.396 [0.024]** 0.429 [0.020]**
1995 dummy 0.354 [0.038]** 0.434 [0.027]** 0.475 [0.022]**
1996 dummy 0.343 [0.041]** 0.480 [0.029]** 0.537 [0.024]**
1997 dummy 0.357 [0.043]** 0.544 [0.030]** 0.601 [0.026]**
1998 dummy 0.390 [0.045]** 0.596 [0.033]** 0.669 [0.028]**
1999 dummy 0.445 [0.045]** 0.696 [0.033]** 0.757 [0.029]**
Log percent Medicare*1990 0.104 [0.059] 0.367 [0.066]** 0.398 [0.066]**
Log percent Medicare*1991 0.059 [0.061] 0.306 [0.063]** 0.357 [0.063]**
Log percent Medicare*1992 0.054 [0.062] 0.280 [0.058]** 0.310 [0.059]**
Log percent Medicare*1993 0.034 [0.066] 0.261 [0.055]** 0.274 [0.056]**
Log percent Medicare*1994 -0.011 [0.063] 0.248 [0.054]** 0.260 [0.055]**
Log percent Medicare*1995 0.117 [0.063] 0.258 [0.053]** 0.269 [0.055]**
Log percent Medicare*1996 0.217 [0.068]** 0.290 [0.054]** 0.287 [0.055]**
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Page 10 of 12public policy, the disproportionate provision of services to
Medicaid beneficiaries and uncompensated care (to the
extent possible given the data limitations), do not appear
to be associated with any reduction in operating expendi-
ture. It is the third safety net dimension, serving a low-SES
population, which is associated with a reduction in profit-
ability and operating expenditure possibly because it is not
used explicitly to allocate subsidies, although even here
the impacts are relatively small. These results suggest that
hospitals providing these activities are unlikely to face
widespread closures. So does this mean that hospitals ser-
ving poor don’t need public support? On the contrary,
because our dependent variable includes government sub-
sidies and because figure 1 indicates that operating mar-
gins were negative, the results signify the importance of
government support in maintaining financial viability. The
methods used by safety net hospitals to maintain financial
viability are beyond the scope of this study but Felland et
al. (2003) provide some possible explanation. The results
of their study indicated that safety net hospitals have been
able to expand and improve services to the uninsured by
streamlining their operations, engaging in integration, and
actively pursuing paying patients.
There are some more disquieting suggestions. On aver-
age, hospitals with vulnerable population profit margins
might have followed overall trends, but this could have
occurred at the expense of lower quality for hospitals with
low-SES populations. Furthermore, some of the time
trends for the late 1990s suggest increasing financial pres-
sure on hospitals serving vulnerable populations. Although
the impacts may not have been disproportionate, since
such hospitals often started from lower profitability, these
trends could indicate more financial pressure than for hos-
pitals beginning with greater financial cushions. These
results taken together suggests that hospitals serving vul-
nerable populations were successful in responding to
financial pressure, but the effects of these responses on
patient’s outcomes needs to be evaluated.
Conclusions
In summary, the complex system of direct and indirect
subsidies provided to hospitals during the 1990s appears
to have been relatively successful in compensating them
for the costs of their safety net activities. However, these
analyses need to be extended into the period where the
full impact of the BBA was felt in order to provide a
Table 3: Effect of safety net activities on operating expenditure (Continued)
Log percent Medicare*1997 0.275 [0.069]** 0.285 [0.055]** 0.290 [0.056]**
Log percent Medicare*1998 0.253 [0.070]** 0.270 [0.058]** 0.266 [0.060]**
Log percent Medicare*1999 0.186 [0.071]** 0.154 [0.060]** 0.175 [0.062]**
Log(System HHI)*1990 -0.135 [0.013]** -0.135 [0.020]** -0.172 [0.020]**
Log(System HHI)*1991 -0.125 [0.013]** -0.128 [0.020]** -0.161 [0.020]**
Log(System HHI)*1992 -0.100 [0.014]** -0.109 [0.020]** -0.138 [0.020]**
Log(System HHI)*1993 -0.078 [0.014]** -0.094 [0.020]** -0.120 [0.020]**
Log(System HHI)*1994 -0.048 [0.015]** -0.074 [0.020]** -0.094 [0.020]**
Log(System HHI)*1995 -0.045 [0.014]** -0.065 [0.019]** -0.082 [0.020]**
Log(System HHI)*1996 -0.041 [0.015]** -0.058 [0.021]** -0.071 [0.021]**
Log(System HHI)*1997 -0.030 [0.016] -0.044 [0.021]* -0.053 [0.022]*
Log(System HHI)*1998 -0.000 [0.016] -0.024 [0.022] -0.027 [0.022]
Log(System HHI)*1999 0.000 [0.017] -0.023 [0.022] -0.022 [0.022]
Mean HMO penetration*1990 0.047 [0.037]
Mean HMO penetration*1991 -0.013 [0.037] -0.037 [0.013]** -0.035 [0.012]**
Mean HMO penetration*1992 -0.084 [0.036]* -0.096 [0.018]** -0.103 [0.016]**
Mean HMO penetration*1993 -0.113 [0.036]** -0.125 [0.020]** -0.136 [0.019]**
Mean HMO penetration*1994 -0.146 [0.037]** -0.143 [0.025]** -0.158 [0.023]**
Mean HMO penetration*1995 -0.166 [0.037]** -0.154 [0.028]** -0.174 [0.026]**
Mean HMO penetration*1996 -0.170 [0.036]** -0.174 [0.031]** -0.195 [0.030]**
Mean HMO penetration*1997 -0.150 [0.036]** -0.178 [0.033]** -0.199 [0.031]**
Mean HMO penetration*1998 -0.090 [0.038]* -0.157 [0.035]** -0.181 [0.034]**
Mean HMO penetration*1999 -0.086 [0.039]* -0.199 [0.037]** -0.220 [0.036]**
Observations 16680 16680 16680
Notes:
Source: AHA Annual Hospital Survey and Medicare Hospital Cost Reports (1990-1999)
aA high score on SES index indicates low socioeconomic status Robust standard errors in brackets
*Significant at p < 0.05; ** significant at p < 0.01%
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Page 11 of 12more definitive portrait of the financial health of hospi-
tals serving the most vulnerable populations.
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